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Abstract
In a number of countries, youth unemployment is a pressing concern. In India, 54% 
of the country’s population is below the age of 25 and faces a high rate of (dis-
guised) unemployment. To augment youth employment, the Government of India 
has launched a number of skills training programs. This paper deals with partici-
pation in and the impact of one of these programs [Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gra-
meen Kaushal Yojana (DDUGKY)] located in rural Bihar, one of India’s poorest 
states. The analysis is based on data collected in mid-2016 and compares trained 
participants with non-participants who applied for the scheme but eventually did 
not attend. We find that the training program squarely reaches the intended tar-
get group—rural poor youth. Initially, the program leads to a 29 percentage point 
increase in the employment rate of the trained graduates. However, 2–6  months 
after the training, the employment effect of the program drops to zero. A third of 
the placed graduates leave their jobs due to caste-based discrimination, and another 
third leave due to a mismatch between the salaries offered and their living costs. The 
upshot is that while the training program enhances job market prospects, other labor 
market factors undo the positive effects.
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1 Introduction
According to the 2013 World Development Report (WDR), worldwide, some 200 
million people, including a disproportionate share of about 75 million who are 
below the age of 25 are unemployed and actively looking for work. The report goes 
on to argue that over 600 million jobs will be needed in the next 15 years to absorb 
the increase in the working-age population, mainly in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
The issue is not only one of unemployment, but is exacerbated by the large pro-
portion of individuals working in the informal economy. Indeed, half of all workers 
in developing countries are engaged in small-scale agriculture or self-employment, 
jobs that don’t provide steady pay-checks and benefits. One of the challenges in 
addressing youth unemployment is the low level of formal schooling compounded 
by the skills gap—that is, the gap between the skills needed by employers and the 
existing skill set of job seekers.
India is an example of a developing country facing a pressing need to devise strat-
egies to provide regular employment to its youthful population.1 India is among the 
youngest nations in the world, and the expected ‘bulge’ in the 15–59 age group over 
the next decade offers an opportunity but also a challenge. The opportunity stems 
from the expected global shortage of 56 million young people (15–35 years), and 
India could potentially serve as a worldwide sourcing hub for skilled manpower 
(Ministry of Labour and Employment 2014). On the other hand, a failure to provide 
opportunities to the youth population as they enter the labor market may translate 
into a ‘demographic disaster’ rather than a dividend (Mitra and Verick 2013).
The twin challenges of creating jobs while at the same time bridging the skills 
gap are well recognized by the Indian Government. Consistent with this policy pri-
ority, on September 25, 2014, the Government launched the ‘Deen Dayal Upad-
hyaya Grameen Kaushal Yojana’ (DDUGKY), a program for training, skill building 
and job placement intended for rural youth from poor families. The vision of the 
program is to:
Transform rural poor youth into an economically independent and globally rel-
evant workforce (Ministry of Rural Development 2016).
The scheme implements skill development through a public–private partner-
ship mode, whereby registered private sector partners or project implementation 
agencies (PIA) plan and implement skills training and place program participants. 
The DDUGKY is not an entitlement program but rather eligible candidates decide 
whether to participate or not, in government-sponsored training programs. Candi-
dates in the age group 15–35 are eligible to participate if they belong to the below-
poverty-line (BPL) category or if any member from their family is a member of a 
1 With a population of 1.21 billion of which more than 62% are in the working-age group of 15–59 years 
and more than 54% are below 25 years, India is among the youngest nations in the world (Ministry of 
Skill Development and Entrepreneurship 2015).
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self-help group (SHG).2 If neither of these conditions are met, then an applicant 
needs to provide a letter of recommendation from the Gram Panchayat (Ministry of 
Rural Development 2016).3
The intention of the DDUGKY and other similar programs is to attenuate unem-
ployment and poverty, but this is possible only if social structures do not hinder vol-
untary participation in the program. If there are differences in program access based 
on caste, gender or other social markers, either in program participation or in job 
placement after training, then increasing government spending and augmenting the 
supply of trained individuals may achieve little toward the final goal of enhancing 
welfare and equity. Hence, from a policy perspective, it is important to examine both 
the factors promoting or hindering scheme participation and to identify the impact 
of the scheme on employment prospects and earnings.
Despite the large number of skills training and employment programs operating 
in India, and the considerable resources expended on such schemes, systematic eval-
uations of their impact on creating employment as well as assessing whether such 
schemes reach the intended population, are limited. This paper offers such an analy-
sis. Based on both, survey and qualitative data, collected in a district in North Bihar, 
this paper examines the role of socio-economic and demographic characteristics in 
determining scheme participation. Subsequently, we evaluate the effect of scheme 
participation on employment and earnings.
Although the study focuses on one course offered through a government-spon-
sored program, that is, the DDUGKY, it has much wider applicability as similar 
programs are being implemented in various parts of the country. For instance, 
another important skill-building program is the ‘Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas 
Yojana’ (PMKVY) which is almost similar to DDUGKY and is also being imple-
mented by the central government. In addition, various state-specific programs such 
as ‘Himayat’ (for rural youth in Jammu & Kashmir), ‘Roshni’ (rural youth in 27 
left-wing extremist districts across 9 states) and ‘Star’ (Standard training assessment 
and reward scheme) are also being implemented.
The rest of the paper unfolds by providing in Sect. 2 a review of the existing lit-
erature on youth training programs with a focus on schemes operating in developing 
countries. Section 3 provides an overview of the DDUGKY. Section 4 discusses the 
sampling strategy and data collection, while Sect.  5 outlines an analytical frame-
work, presents results and explores the financial returns from the program. Section 6 
contains concluding remarks.
2 BPL is used by the Indian government to identify individuals and households in need of government 
assistance. Internationally, an income of less than $1.90 per day per head in purchasing power parity 
terms is defined as extreme poverty. In India, the number of people living on or less than $1.90 per day 
based on the 2011 census was 259.5 million (21.3% of the population). In India, BPL scoring is done on 
the basis of 13 parameters ranging from 0 to 4. Families that score 17 or less out of 52 are classified as 
BPL.
3 A gram panchayat is a village-level administrative body whose main task is to implement development 
programs. It is part of a three-tier Panchayati Raj Institution (village, block and district level) created by 
the 73rd amendment of the constitution. There are about 250,000 gram panchayats in India.
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2  Skills Training Programs in Developing Countries: A Brief Review
There is a large and active body of research using a variety of methodological 
approaches on the effect of skills training programs on employment outcomes and 
earnings in OECD countries. For instance, Björklund (1994) and Forslund and 
Krueger (1997) provide early reviews of the evidence based on Sweden’s experi-
ence with such programs, while Heckman et  al. (1999) review the US literature.4 
Based on the US experience, Heckman et al. (1999) conclude that job training pro-
grams have modest positive effects on adult earnings and no impact on the youth. 
These early reviews have been followed by multi-country reviews of experiences in 
other OECD countries. For instance, De Koning (2005) reviews 130 studies while 
Kluve (2010) assesses the effects of active labor market programs including skills 
training programs based on 73 microeconomic evaluations carried out in Europe. 
De Koning (2005) concludes that training interventions have no effect on unem-
ployed young workers while Kluve (2010) writes that ‘traditional training programs 
are found to have a modest likelihood of recording a positive impact on post-pro-
gram employment rates’ but that programs targeted at the youth are less successful. 
Meager (2009) assesses the various review articles and concludes that the impact 
of vocational training programs is modest, at best, and that only small-scale pro-
grams targeted at groups experiencing a skill shortage coupled with active employer 
engagement and on-the-job training are likely to be effective at enhancing employ-
ment prospects. Kluve (2010) reports that ‘program type is by far the most impor-
tant variable influencing post-program employment probabilities’ and with regard to 
the effectiveness of training programs as compared to other active labor market pro-
grams (ALMP) he states ‘training measures sit in the middle of the hierarchy: nei-
ther the most effective measures, nor the least.’ Meager (2009) also argues that is not 
‘generally the case’ that larger impacts are observed over a longer post-intervention 
period while at the same time pointing out that the lack of skill-training effects may 
be due to slack labor demand, especially in developed countries where skill levels 
are already high.
Till recently, most of the evidence regarding the effectiveness of skills training 
programs came from developed and transition countries. However, there is now a 
growing body of work on developing countries. In their first study, Dar and Tzan-
natos (1999) covered 72 evaluations but almost all of them focused on developed 
countries. However, their updated work (Betcherman et  al. 2004) added 39 addi-
tional evaluations from developing and transition countries including 19 evaluations 
of youth training programs of which 14 were from developed countries and five 
from developing countries. Betcherman et al. (2004) review of the effects of the five 
youth training and employment generation programs in Latin America shows that 
in contrast to the zero effects of such programs in developed countries, all the Latin 
American interventions report a positive effect on the probability of employment 
4 Active labor market programs were initially developed in Scandinavia and thereafter spread to other 
OECD countries (Meager 2009).
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and two of the three reported positive impact on earnings.5 The sharp difference in 
findings across different contexts is perhaps not unexpected as trainees in developing 
countries have lower levels of formal education and skills, and it is quite likely that 
their employability is hampered by a shortage of skills. While the experiences based 
on these schemes are encouraging, the picture emerging from several recent rand-
omized evaluations of training programs targeted at disadvantaged youth does not 
yield such a sanguine picture.6 For instance, Card et al. (2011) and Ibarrarán et al. 
(2014) analyze the impact of a vocational training program in the Dominican Repub-
lic, while Cho et al. (2013) analyze the effect of an intervention in Malawi. In both 
countries, reminiscent of the developed country literature, the interventions have no 
effect on employment. Attanasio et  al. (2011) find mixed evidence in the case of 
Colombia, where training leads to a 7 percentage point increase in employment and 
a 20% increase in earnings, but only for young women. In contrast to the women-
only effect in Colombia, Alzua et al. (2016) find large effects for men in the case of 
a youth training program in Cordoba, Argentina. Their randomized evaluation based 
on a sample size of 407 individuals (220 treatment and 187 control) participants 
who were followed for a long period shows that in the short term (18 months after 
the program), program participation increases the probability of employment by 8 
percentage points and earnings by about 40%. However, these effects do not last and 
dissipate in the medium term (33 months) and long term (48 months).7 McKenzie 
(2017) review this recent literature which includes 12 evaluations of skill-building 
training programs from eight countries. Typically, the evaluations measure impact 
12–18 months after the conclusion of the training program. Three of the nine studies 
find a statistically significant impact on employment. The simple unweighted aver-
age across the studies is a 2.3 percentage point increase in employment. There is a 
slightly larger impact on formal employment—the average impact across the studies 
is a 3.6 percentage point increase in formal employment.
In the Indian context, we were unable to find studies that have estimated the 
impact of youth skills training programs sponsored by the government. Although 
not offered by the government, an experimental study designed by Maitra and Mani 
(2017) and implemented in co-operation with non-governmental organizations 
offers estimates of the impact of a 6-month stitching and tailoring training program 
targeted at young women (aged 18–39 years) in New Delhi. The paper examined the 
5 The youth training employment programs (Joven) in Latin America were initiated in Chile in 1991, 
and thereafter, similar programs have been implemented in Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. 
The various programs target youth from low-income families, with low educational attainment, and 
with limited or no job experience. The programs consist of basic literacy, training in a trade which is 
in demand, work experience, and help finding a job. Typically, the intervention lasts for 6 months and 
includes 200–400 h of training and 2–3 months of work experience.
6 Other experimental evaluations of vocational training program in developing countries include Ace-
vedo et al. (2017) for the Dominican Republic, Attanasio et al. (2017) for Columbia, Maitra and Mani 
(2017) for India, Diaz and Rosas (2016) for Peru, Honorati (2015) for Kenya.
7 Although their paper does not focus on disadvantaged youth but on the general unemployed popula-
tion, Hirshleifer et al. (2016) use a randomised experiment to assess the effect of a large-scale vocational 
training program in Turkey and conclude that the effect of being assigned to training had a 2 percentage 
point, but statistically not significant effect on the probability of being employed.
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impact of the program 6 months and 18 months after program completion on a sam-
ple of 594 women (409 treatment and 185 control). According to the study’s find-
ings, in the short term, women who received training were 4 percentage points more 
likely to be self-employed, 6 percentage points more likely to be employed and earn 
150% more per month as compared to the control group. The effects persisted in the 
medium term. While the effects are impressive, the authors report that only 56% of 
those assigned to treatment completed the course and that there were a number of 
barriers to entry, chiefly, lack of access to credit, lack of child-care support and the 
distance from residence to the training center.
This paper analyses the effect of a training program sponsored by the DDUGKY 
on employment and earnings. While it is not based on an experiment, the empiri-
cal approach which is based on comparing participants with non-participants who 
expressed a desire in the scheme but did not eventually join, yields an arguably cred-
ible design. We work with what may seem like a relatively small sample of 526 
respondents, but it is large as compared to the total pool of trained participants and 
the sample size is comparable to those in Alzua et al. (2016) and Maitra and Mani 
(2017).
The paper is a potentially useful addition to the literature and policy debates on 
the relevance and usefulness of such training schemes. It offers perhaps the first 
estimates of the impact of a training course sponsored by the DDUGKY. Given the 
resources expended on the DDUGKY and similar programs, an assessment of their 
effectiveness in generating employment and the cost at which they do so is sorely 
needed. Second, the bulk of the international literature focuses on youth training 
programs for disadvantaged urban youth, while this paper focuses on disadvantaged 
rural youth living in one of India’s poorest states, that is, a group which is more 
likely to face a skills gap as well as other challenges compared to urban youth.8 In 
principle, this is a target group for whom such skills training programs should be 
particularly effective.
3  DDUGKY
On September 2014, under the aegis of its National Rural Livelihood Mission, the 
Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) announced the DDUGKY. The scheme tar-
gets rural families who fall below the poverty line. Individuals from such families 
who are in the age range 15–35 are eligible for government-sponsored training and 
post-training job placement in positions that offer regular monthly wages.9
The DDUGKY skilling ecosystem consists of The Ministry of Rural Develop-
ment (MoRD) or the National Mission Management Unit (NMMU), State Missions, 
9 Additional details are available on http://ddugk y.gov.in/.
8 For instance, in urban settings, information on the job market and accessibility to training programs 
may be more readily available; thus, the primary determinants for decision making may be individual 
competitiveness and attitude. However, in a rural setting, information barriers may be more binding and 
accessibility to training programs may depend on gender, caste or class.
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Project Implementing Agencies (PIA) and Technical Support Agencies (TSA). The 
MoRD is responsible for framing policy, monitoring the scheme and in collabora-
tion with state governments, responsible for providing funds.10 Identification of 
courses to be offered is based on skills gap assessment studies carried out by the 
National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) as well as inputs from state mis-
sions. On the basis of these studies, DDUGKY invites tenders from private sector 
partners who wish to provide training. State missions are responsible for planning 
and implementing the program through the private sector PIA. The PIA are respon-
sible for identifying prospective applicants, providing information on the training 
courses, delivering training and placing the trained graduates.
To elaborate, the PIA begins the implementation process by embarking on a pro-
cess of community mobilization and awareness building using different modes such 
as awareness camps, job fairs, placing banners, distributing handbills and pamphlets 
and door-to-door counseling. PIA also involves village self-help groups (SHG) and 
gram panchayats (GP) in their efforts to reach out to eligible candidates. After mobi-
lization, candidates who have indicated an interest in a training program are asked to 
complete a field registration form and are then invited for counseling. During coun-
seling, candidates and in some instances, their parents are given information on the 
nature of work in the selected sector, availability of jobs, growth prospects and the 
challenges. The counseling sessions are also used to determine whether the appli-
cants fulfill eligibility conditions. After counseling, the list of selected candidates is 
sent for approval to the state missions, and once approved, the candidates may join 
the training program.
Each course offered through the DDUGKY consists of two broad components. 
The first component includes training on soft skills, English and information tech-
nology and the second component deals with sector specific training. Depending on 
the course, the duration of training may be for 3 (576 h), 6 (1152 h), 9 (1578 h) 
or 12  months (2304  h). The scheme provides for on-the-job training (OJT) rang-
ing from a maximum permissible 30 days for a 3-month course to 120 days for a 
1-year course. The training courses offered by the PIA have to be approved by the 
National Council for Vocational Training (NCVT) or Sector Skill Councils (SSCs). 
These TSA also provide support in terms of designing the curriculum and certifying 
the trained graduates.11
Post-training, PIA are required to place a minimum of 70% of trained individu-
als in jobs which offer regular monthly wages at or above a minimum monthly 
wage of Rs. 6000.12 The scheme has provisions for post-placement financial 
10 The bulk of the funding, 75%, comes from the central government through the MoRD and the remain-
der from state governments, except for the North-Eastern states where central funding accounts for 90%.
11 Two types of quality controls assessments are mandated under DDUGKY. The first is an internal and 
continuous assessment, which is conducted by PIA on a regular basis and monitored by the states gov-
ernment on a bimonthly basis. The second is third-party assessment and certification of trainees by agen-
cies approved by the National Council for Vocational Training (NCVT) or Sector Skill Councils (SSCs). 
It is mandatory for 70% of the trained candidates per batch to be certified.
12 Prior to project approval, PIAs are required to submit a tentative list of employers to the DDUGKY 
administration. This list is part of the PIA’s proposal, but the jobs actually provided to candidates may 
or may not be the same as those on the proposed list. In practice, the placement officer of the PIA liaises 
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support.13 To enhance employment sustainability, all trained/placed candidates 
are tracked for 1 year. During this year, they are also entitled to counseling and 
guidance.
As of 2016, DDUGKY operates in 21 States/Union Territories, covering 568 of 
India’s 687 districts. The scheme offers about 690 courses in more than 330 trades 
catering to 82 industry sectors. The training is offered through over 300 private 
training partners. According to the latest reports, over 270,000 candidates have been 
trained and over 134,000 candidates have been placed in jobs. Since its inception, 
DDUGKY has invested more than Rs. 56 billion or about USD 838 million.14
Based on the USD 838 million spent since scheme inception and the number of 
individuals trained (270,000), the average amount spent per trained individual is 
about USD 3100 or Rs. 217,210. If this is restricted to those who have been placed, 
then the average cost per placement is USD 6250 or Rs. 437,710. Details on the 
minimum and maximum fee that may be charged by a PIA for training candidates 
are provided in Table 1.15
4  Sampling Approach and Data
The sampling and data collection approaches were developed in collaboration with 
a local NGO, which is also a DDUGKY implementing partner.16 The district where 
the data collection was carried out is located in North Bihar and was selected as the 
first author is conversant with the social context and the language and also because 
the selected district started implementing the scheme in 2014 which provides a suf-
ficient number of trained individuals to carry out an evaluation. The selected dis-
trict is not particularly different from other rural areas of Bihar. The bulk of the 
13 Candidates are entitled to post-placement financial support through the PIA. An amount of Rs. 1000 
per month is available for 2 months in case the placement is within the district of residence; Rs. 1000 per 
month for 3 months if placement is outside the district but within the state of residence; and Rs. 1000 per 
month for 6 months if placement is outside the state of residence.
14 http://ddugk y.gov.in/conte nt/about -us-0.
15 There are separate budget lines for the cost of training, boarding and lodging costs for residential 
training, transport costs for non-residential training, post-placement tracking and support, incentives for 
the PIA for placement and post-placement activities, assessment and certification.
16 To ensure confidentiality, we do not reveal the name of the district or the name of the local NGO. 
However, we do have information which provides an idea of the quality of training provided by the NGO. 
The NGO has 19 employees of which 7 are trainers. The lead trainer has a B.A. in Business Administra-
tion and a M.A. in Social Work. There is a dedicated soft skills trainer with a B.A. degree; two trainers 
who specialize in retail sales training both of whom have M.A degrees in Business Administration and 
an IT trainer with a B.A degree, a 1-year computer diploma and several short diploma courses. In short, 
on paper, the NGO seems to have enough well-trained personnel to deliver a quality program.
Footnote 12 (continued)
with potential employers using all possible networks on a continuous basis. Post-placement, proof of 
regular wage has to be demonstrated either by a salary slip from the human resource department of the 
organization or in the absence of a human resource department, a certificate issued by the employer indi-
cating wages paid and counter signed by the employee along with a bank statement.
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population is engaged in agriculture, non-farm opportunities are limited, and caste 
remains a dominant social marker (Table 2).
The NGO provided a complete list of 520 individuals who had participated in 
its 3-month (576 h) residential retail sales training course and a complete list of an 
additional 721 applicants who had shown an explicit interest in the course and had 
filled the field registration form but subsequently did not pursue the process and did 
not participate in the course.17 The lists were checked to ensure that there were no 
duplicates and that program participants did not also appear in the list of program 
non-participants and vice versa. Keeping in mind statistical (see note below for 
details on power calculations) and budgetary considerations, about 50% of the par-
ticipants (263 participants) and an equal number of non-participants were randomly 
sampled, yielding a total sample of 526 participants and non-participants.18
Data collection was carried out between July and August 2016 by a team led by 
the first author. The survey instrument gathered information on a range of individual 
and household socio-economic and demographic characteristics including questions 
on the respondent’s religion, caste, age, sex, years of education, occupation, income 
and membership of various social programs. In addition, information on the same 
characteristics was also collected for parents of the respondents as well as on their 
land holdings and housing characteristics.
The survey gathered information on current (post-training) employment and 
earning status of participants and non-participants, that is, between 2 and 6 months 
after completion of the course. We also enquired whether they were offered jobs 
after training, as well as their employment and earnings status at the time that indi-
viduals applied for the training programs (pre-training). Thus, we have informa-
tion on employment outcomes at three points in time, that is, pre-training, imme-
diately after training, and 2–6 months after training. The pre-training information 
and immediate post-training employment and earnings status are both based on 
recall which may raise concerns about the quality of the data. However, given the 
short duration of the course and the relatively short time-span between program 
inception and the survey this is unlikely to be a problem. At most, respondents 
were being asked to recall their employment and earnings 9  months before the 
survey.19
19 The most recently trained batch had graduated 2 months prior to the survey, and the first trained batch 
had graduated 6 months prior to the survey. Taking into account the duration of the course, it implies that 
pre-training or pre-application information regarding employment and earnings is based on recall periods 
of 5 to at most 9 months prior to the survey.
17 The NGO offers only a 3-month course, and participants do not have an option to choose the duration 
of the course.
18 Based on an employment rate of 10% for the control group (see Maitra and Mani 2017) and a mod-
est expected effect of a 10 percentage point increase in post-training employment, a sample size of 526, 
equally split between participants and non-participants and 5% probability of making a type I error has a 
power of 0.87. The expected effect may seem large as compared to the effects reported in the literature, 
but it is close to the 8–10 percentage point effect on employment as reported in Maitra and Mani (2017) 
and Alzua et  al. (2016). Given the nature of the intervention which is expected to achieve 70% post-
program job placement, the expected effect size used to compute power is very modest.
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In addition to the structured survey, the instrument contained a set of open-ended 
questions which asked participants why they enrolled and likewise asked non-par-
ticipants why they did not enroll. Additionally, for those who had been offered jobs 
after training and were no longer working, we also enquired why they had not con-
tinued with the jobs that they had been offered.
5  Analytical Framework
5.1  Participation in the DDUGKY
The scheme is intended for rural poor youth and the first issue that we examine is 
whether the program reaches its intended target group. Since the scheme is intended 
for below-poverty-line (BPL) families and/or if any household member participates 
in a self-help group (SHG), in addition to analyzing the role of several individual 
and household socio-economic and demographic characteristics, we explicitly exam-
ine the link between being a BPL or a SHG household and program participation.
Specifically, the probability that an individual (i) joins the scheme (DDUGKY = 1) 
is treated as a function of individual characteristics (I) including, sex, age, years of 
education, religion and caste of the applicant; household characteristics (H) include 
age and education of parents, father’s occupation, land holdings, ownerships of 
house, type of house, monthly income, BPL card holder and whether any member 
of the household is a member of a self-help group. To control for supply side effects 
(SS), we also control for distance to the training center. Accordingly, the probability 
of enrolling in the training scheme is scheme is written as,
and several variants of (1) are estimated using a probit specification.
5.2  Impact of DDUGKY
Given the voluntary nature of the DDUGKY, there are two key econometric 
issues which require discussion while attempting to identify its impact. These are 
(1)p
(
DDUGKYi = 1
)
= f
(
훼Ii , 휃Hi , 훽SSi, 휀i
)
Table 1  Cost per candidate
For residential training
Duration in months 3 6 9 12
Minimum cost per candidate (Rs.) 37,439 69,778 1,03,116 1,35,455
Maximum cost per candidate including 
incentives for PIA (Rs.)
89,197 1,41,795 1,95,392 2,47,990
For non-residential training
Minimum cost per candidate (Rs.) 30,689 56,278 82,866 108,455
Maximum cost per candidate including 
incentives for PIA (Rs.)
81,197 115,795 151,392 185,990
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self-selection into program participation and attrition or dropping out before com-
pletion of training. To deal with the former, especially selection on unobservables, 
we use a control group of non-participants randomly drawn from a sample of indi-
viduals who registered for the program but did not eventually join. The use of such 
a control group is expected to reduce differences in unobservable traits between the 
program participants and non-participants. A second source of concern is that not all 
participants complete the program. If only a select few complete the program, then 
evaluating program outcomes on the basis of comparisons between non-participants 
and participants who complete a program may lead to misleading inferences. Our 
examination of the administrative records shows that while it is not negligible, the 
dropout rate is not particularly high and that 87% of those who start do complete. 
This should not be surprising as the training program lasts for 3 months.
With this background in mind and given the data at hand, there are two 
approaches that may be used to assess the impact of the DDUGKY. First, we pro-
pose to rely only on the current (post-training) outcomes and estimate the effect of 
having received training on employment and earnings (yi), after controlling for indi-
vidual and household characteristics. That is,
where 훽 is the coefficient of interest. We estimate (2) using OLS and explore the 
sensitivity of the estimates to alternative estimators such as propensity score match-
ing inverse probability weighting and instrumental variable (IV) estimation. In the 
case of all three alternatives, the first-step involves estimation of the probability 
of participation based on (1).20 The use of a control group as discussed above to 
account for selection on unobservables and the use of statistical methods to control 
for differences in observables is likely to yield credible estimates. However, it is still 
possible that those who joint the program and completed it are different in terms of 
their unobserved characteristics as compared to who did not join the scheme. For 
instance, participants who join and complete may be more motivated or more able 
which may also affect their chances of finding employment and may lead to inflated 
estimates of program effects on outcomes. While the direction of the bias is not 
always clear, it is possible that, Cov
(
DDUGKYi, 휀i
)
≠ 0.
An alternative, since we have information on pre-training and post-training out-
comes, is to estimate a value-added or panel data version of (2). That is, we estimate 
the extent to which changes in employment and earnings may be attributed to par-
ticipation in DDUGKY after controlling for time ( 휆t ) and individual fixed effects 
( 휂i ). That is,
This specification will yield unbiased estimates of the program on employ-
ment and earnings, as long as participation and outcomes are driven by time-
invariant unobserved characteristics. However, if the two groups (participants and 
(2)yi = f
(
훼Ii , 휃Hi , 훽DDUGKYi, 휀i
)
,
(3)yit = f
(
훽DDUGKYit, 휆t, 휂i, 휀it
)
.
20 In the case of the IV estimator, we rely on differences in functional form for identification. Alternative 
specifications based on imposing exclusion restrictions did not yield different results.
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non-participants) are exposed to different time-varying idiosyncratic errors then 
estimates based on (3) are still likely to be biased. While this is unlikely, given that 
both groups reside in the same district and there is a fairly short time-span between 
pre- and post-training, it remains a possibility.
5.3  Results
5.3.1  Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. These statistics allow us to gauge whether the 
training program does target the rural poor and also to examine whether our empiri-
cal approach, which is based on comparing those who participate in the training pro-
gram versus those who expressed an interest but did not finally participate, delivers 
a credible control group.
The average individual who has shown an interest (that is, both those who attend 
and do not attend) in the training programs is about 21  years old and has about 
15 years of education. The majority of the sample (69%) is male, and a similar pro-
portion (71%) falls in the category of scheduled caste/tribe (SC/ST). Almost all the 
respondents (92%) belong to below-poverty-line households, and 37% live in non-
permanent houses. Only about 9% report that they are employed and conditional 
on being employed they earn about Rs. 5000 a month. The main point emerging 
from the descriptive statistics is that the training program is clearly well-targeted at 
rural poor households. For instance, the proportion of SC/ST in the sample is sub-
stantially higher than the proportion for Bihar (17.3% according to Census 2011). 
Similarly, the estimated head count ratio of poverty in rural Bihar is 34.3% (Reserve 
Bank of India, 2016), while in the sample it is more than 90%.
With regard to the individual traits of the respondents, comparison of means 
across the two groups shows that there are no statistically significant differences 
in terms of the outcome variables across the two groups. Both groups are equally 
likely to be employed and conditional on employment have, on average, the same 
monthly earnings. Age and caste composition is also similar. While the difference 
in educational attainment is statistically significant, the difference is not substantial, 
15.7 years of education for participants versus 15.3 for applicants. There are differ-
ences in the gender composition with a smaller proportion of males (66%) in the 
training group (66 vs. 73%) and at the same time those who opt for training are more 
likely to be married (22 vs. 13%). With regard to their household background—both 
groups are equally likely to belong to below-poverty-line households, their house-
hold incomes are similar and they also have access to the same housing infrastruc-
ture. There are differences in the educational and occupational backgrounds of their 
parents. Those who attend training have more educated fathers (7 vs. 5 years) who 
are more likely to be self-employed in agriculture. Consistent with the difference 
in occupational distribution, their families also own more land (6 vs. 3 kathas). 
Although the training course that they attend is residential, participants live about 
5 km closer to the center than non-participants (25 vs. 30 km).
1 3
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Overall, while not perfectly balanced, the approach of comparing those who par-
ticipate versus those who register for the program but finally do not join appears to 
deliver an arguably credible control group. Differences across the two groups are 
not very pronounced. Most notably, before the training, the two groups are similar 
in terms of their employment and earnings outcomes as well as their caste, BPL, 
household income and housing quality status. There are differences in parental edu-
cation, father’s occupation and agricultural land holdings; however, these are likely 
to be time-invariant and may be partialled out while estimating the effect of training 
on changes in employment and earnings.
5.3.2  Program Participation
Notwithstanding the discussion of the participant-specific descriptive statistics 
which provide an idea of factors that influence participation, formal estimates of 
program participation are provided in Table 3. Consistent with the descriptive sta-
tistics, across the various specifications—education—both of the respondent and 
the father of the respondent are positively associated with participation. Married 
individuals are 11–15 percentage points more likely to participate perhaps due to 
a greater sense of responsibility and a desire for economic independence. As com-
pared to all other occupational categories, children of parent’s whose fathers are 
self-employed in agriculture are substantially more likely to seek training. The esti-
mates show that employment in agriculture is even less attractive than working as a 
daily wage worker, and it appears that rural youth are keen on seeking out non-agri-
cultural opportunities. Apart from these variables, and not surprising given the bal-
ance between the two groups, sex, age, caste, household income, agricultural land 
owned and poverty status have no bearing on participation.
In addition to the formal estimates, Table 4 provides information based on con-
versations with participants on their reasons for joining the scheme and their views 
on scheme satisfaction. It also contains information on why non-participants did not 
join the scheme. As far as participants are concerned, the most common reason to 
enroll is their expectation that the training will increase their income (60%), fol-
lowed by boosting their chances of acquiring an urban lifestyle (55%), their inherent 
interest in the course on offer (55%), the best available option at the time (52%) and 
an increase in their social status (49%). Although it was not mentioned as often, 22% 
expected that the course would help them join ‘mainstream development’—which 
along with a desire to acquire an urban lifestyle may also be interpreted as a desire 
to move away from rural occupations and rural areas. While the NGO seems to have 
a number of well-educated personnel to deliver the course, post-scheme participa-
tion, about 27% rated the program as average and a large proportion (64.6%) of the 
participants were not satisfied with the training.
Non-participants were asked who took the participation decision and to provide 
the single-most important reason for not-participating. In a majority of the cases 
(59%), individuals decided not to attend of their own volition, parents decided in 
27% of the cases and for the remainder (14%), the training institute did not follow 
 The Indian Journal of Labour Economics
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Table 3  Probability of participating in the training programs—marginal effects after probit (std. error)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Individual characteristics
Sex −0.1012*
(0.05773)
−0.0513
(0.06326)
−0.0437
(0.064)
Age 0.0016
(0.01003)
0.0046
(0.01122)
0.0033
(0.01123)
Years of education 0.0381***
(0.01449)
0.0301**
(0.0156)
0.0322**
(0.01574)
Married 0.1154*
(0.07115)
0.1570**
(0.07377)
0.1464**
(0.07485)
Number of children −0.0265
(0.027)
−0.0265
(0.03211)
−0.0244
(0.02994)
Muslim −0.1854*
(0.10227)
−0.0728
(0.11726)
−0.0835
(0.11702)
Schedule caste −0.0567
(0.09846)
0.0386
(0.10443)
0.0490
(0.10476)
Other backward caste −0.0197
(0.10598)
0.0594
(0.11271)
0.0661
(0.11288)
Household characteristics
Age of father – −0.0007
(0.00114)
−0.0006
(0.00113)
Age of mother – −0.0029
(0.00337)
−0.0028
(0.00339)
Years of education of father – 0.0120***
(0.00496)
0.0116***
(0.00498)
Years of education of mother – 0.0016
(0.00698)
0.0015
(0.007)
Father’s main occupation—unengaged in economic activity – 0.0314
(0.11412)
0.0310
(0.11452)
Father’s main occupation—self-employed in non-agriculture – −0.2290***
(0.07089)
−0.2277***
(0.07096)
Father’s main occupation—informal regular wage earning 
(non-agriculture)
– −0.2779***
(0.0979)
−0.2744***
(0.09859)
Father’s main occupation—formal regular wage earning 
(non-agriculture)
– −0.0218
(0.16016)
−0.0098
(0.16109)
Father’s main occupation—daily wage worker – −0.1790***
(0.05577)
−0.1852***
(0.05598)
Number of earning members in family – 0.1610***
(0.0625)
0.1604***
(0.06275)
Monthly household income in Rupees—pre-training – −0.0582
(0.0605)
−0.0594
(0.06063)
Land owned in local unit (katha; 1 katha = 126m2) – 0.0046
(0.003)
0.0043
(0.00299)
Katcha (non-permanent) house – 0.1285
(0.08403)
0.1354
(0.0847)
Semi-Pucca (semi-permanent) house – 0.1894**
(0.08528)
0.1987**
(0.0857)
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up—for no clear reason or because they did not fulfill the eligibility conditions.21 
The most commonly mentioned reason (21%) for not joining was that the expected 
salary (Rs. 6000 a month) post-training was not attractive enough, followed by 
family responsibilities (18%) and that they were seeking alternative educational 
opportunities (16%).22 Distance to the training center was mentioned by 10% of the 
respondents and negative feedback about the course by 6.5%.
5.4  Impact of DDUGKY
5.4.1  Employment
Tables  5 and 6 provide information on the impact of the training program on 
employment and earnings. Before commencement of the program, the employment 
rates of both groups were around 8–9%, and conditional on working, monthly earn-
ings were about Rs. 5000. Immediately after the end of the training, about 42% of 
the participants received job placements while the share of non-participants with 
jobs rose from 8.4 to 12.2%. Formal, regression-based estimates which control for 
time trends and fixed effects yield a job offer employment impact estimate of 29 per-
centage points. The DDUGKY mandates that 70% of the graduates must be placed. 
Table 3  (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Pucca (permanent) house—financed by government scheme – 0.1171
(0.08864)
0.1355
(0.08926)
Below-poverty-line household – −0.0314
(0.10253)
−0.0380
(0.10274)
Self-help group household – 0.1607***
(0.05149)
0.1657***
(0.05153)
Supply side –
Distance to the training center (km) – – −0.0012*
(0.00069)
Observations 512 509 509
Pseudo R-squared 0.0303 0.1133 0.1175
Log pseudo likelihood −344.09318 −312.72348 −310.61427
Standard errors in parentheses; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
21 Dropping these ineligible individuals from the non-participant sample increases comparability of the 
two groups but does not alter the impact of the program.
22 On one of the reasons for not participating, a focus group discussant mentioned, “You often don’t get 
a job after training and even if you get a job the salary is not good. Many of my friends have completed 
the training but still they are without jobs. One of my friends got a job of Rs.6000/month in Patna. Now 
you tell me….is this job of any use? You can’t save single paisa for yourself, and then there is no ques-
tion of sending any money to parents. I can do a job in any shop near my village or might go far as the 
block headquarter and they will pay me 3000–4000 per month. This according to me is a much better 
option” [Translated from Hindi, Interviewed on July 26, 2016].
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Table 4  Reasons for 
participating and not 
participating and satisfaction
Participants
Reasons for participating in %
Low opportunity cost/best option at that time 52
(137)
Increase in income 60
(158)
Increase in social status 49
(130)
Long-term future prospects 41
(108)
Urban life style 55
(144)
Join mainstream development 22
(57)
Inclination to service/jobs 55
(145)
Satisfaction with the training in %
Very satisfied 8
(21)
Average 27.4
(72)
Not satisfied 64.6
(170)
Reasons for not participating in % Non-part.
Own decision 59
(155)
Negative feedback from participants 6.5
(17)
Seeking educational opportunities 16.3
(43)
Unattractive salary prospects 21
(56)
Not interested 4.6
(12)
Distance to training center 10.3
(27)
Family decision 27
(71)
Family responsibilities 18.3
(48)
Marriage 8
(3)
Parents did not allow 5.7
(15)
Decision of training organization 14
(37)
Not BPL or SHG 7.2
(19)
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However, as compared to the international literature on the estimates of vocational 
training programs on employment rates, the placement of 42% of the candidates and 
an impact of 29 percentage points is astounding. However, at the time of the survey, 
that is, about 2–6 months after the end of the training we find that the difference in 
the employment rate across the two groups is only 3.4 percentage points which is 
at par with the estimates reported in McKenzie (2017). Regardless of the statistical 
approach used (also see Table 9), that is cross section estimates that control for indi-
vidual and household traits or fixed effect estimates, the impact of the training pro-
gram on employment is not statistically different from zero. The magnitude ranges 
from 3 to 3.4 percentage points.
Table 4  (continued) Participants
Under Age 1.5
(4)
Training organization did not contact 5.3
(14)
For those who participated, multiple responses were possible. Non-
participants were asked to indicate who decided and the most impor-
tant reason for not participating
Number of observations are reported in parentheses
Table 5  Pre-training, immediate post-training and current outcomes
The total number of observations is 263 for participants and 263 for non-participants. Standard devia-
tions for continuous variables are in parentheses. Post-training refers to outcomes between 2 and 
6 months after training
Outcomes Pre-training Immediately 
after training
Post-training
(at time of survey)
Part. Non-part. Part. Non-Part. Part. Non-part.
Employed (%) 8.74 8.4 41.8 12.5 16.0 12.5
N 23 22 110 33 42 33
Not offered a job (%) – – 58.2 – 58.2 .
N – – 153 – 153 .
Left job due to caste discrimination (%) – – – – 12.5 .
N 33
Left job-out-of-state state placement and low 
salary
– – – – 13
N 35
Monthly earnings (Rupees) 426.8
(1547)
449
(1780)
– – 933.5
(2456)
727
(2218)
Monthly earnings if employed (Rupees) 4881
(2404)
5372
(3435)
– – 5845
(3023)
5791
(3168)
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The sharp drop in employment rates within a few months after training is intrigu-
ing and led us to engage in deeper conversations with all the participants. The entire 
set of 153 trainees who had not been placed after training remained unemployed at the 
time of the survey. Of the 110 who had received placements, 42 were continuing in 
their positions. Of the remainder who had been placed, 33 fled their positions or were 
forced to leave their jobs, some within days others within a few weeks. The ostensible 
reason appears to be discrimination at the hands of their employers and employees. 
The respondents reported that they were treated harshly due to their low-caste status, 
most of the time by other employees and at times by employers. For instance, they 
were not allowed to use toilets and kitchens and to eat or sit in common areas desig-
nated for such purposes.23 The remaining 35 participants had been offered out-of-state 
placements (in urban areas) and despite the desire to access an urban lifestyle and seek 
out non-agricultural opportunities, they rejected these offers as the salaries offered 
were deemed to be too low as compared to living costs.24 Some rejected offers on the 
spot while others worked for a short while before returning to their homes.
5.4.2  Quality and Nature of Jobs
While there is no discernible effect of the program on employment status, it is pos-
sible that the training program translates into better quality of jobs as captured by 
higher wages and/or enhances the ability of participants to access non-agricultural 
jobs. Information on the impact of the training scheme on monthly earnings is pro-
vided in Tables 5 and 6. Earnings of participants does seem to be higher, however, 
regardless of whether we control or not for various characteristics or rely on the 
fixed effects as opposed to the cross section estimates, we are unable to detect a 
statistically significant impact of the training program on earnings. The occupational 
distribution of participants and non-participants is displayed in Table 7. There are 
clear differences across the two groups. While the occupational distribution of the 
non-participants does not exhibit much variation over time, there is a clear change in 
the case of participants. All those who participated and are now employed are work-
ing in the informal, non-agriculture sector in wage paying positions. Based on their 
desire to move away from agricultural occupations, the post-training occupational 
distribution is a positive development.
23 For instance during a focus group discussion a participant commented—“Almost immediately after 
joining the job, three of us were sent to one branch office of the company for hands on training for 
10 days. But, we could attend that training for only 3 days as we were not allowed to use any public 
facility in that office. We were neither allowed to use any of the washrooms nor even touch any tap, nor 
enter the canteen. When we asked the reason for this behavior, we were told that we belong to low caste. 
So after three days we resigned from the job and returned to our village” [Translated from Hindi, Inter-
viewed on July 25, 2016].
24 During discussions, the respondents explained that if they are placed anywhere outside their home 
districts then expected expenditure on house rent would lie between Rs. 2500 and 3000. They expect to 
incur between Rs. 3000 and 3500 on food and other items to meet basic needs. So with a salary of Rs. 
6000, they do not expect to remit more than Rs. 500 to their families and this is too small an amount to 
warrant an out-of-district placement. They repeatedly mentioned that they would be more than happy to 
work for a salary of Rs. 6000 within the district.
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5.4.3  Rates of Return
The training course offered by the PIA in the current analysis was budgeted at Rs. 
61,304 per participant. While some of the payments such as transport are based on actu-
als, and others only need to be paid out if targets are met, the tuition cost and the living 
costs of the participants or in other words the minimum cost that has to be incurred by 
the government for the three-month residential training course is Rs. 37,439. Both the 
minimum cost and the budgeted cost are likely to underestimate the total cost of pro-
ducing a trained graduate as these don’t include payments to various other stakehold-
ers involved in the scheme. Based on the available macro data on the total resources 
expended on the DDUGKY since inception and the number of trained individuals, the 
per person cost of training a graduate is estimated to be Rs. 217,210. We work with 
these three cost estimates to provide a sense of the rate of return to the current training 
course based on achieving different employment impacts (see Table 8).
Based on the minimum cost and the estimated 3% employment effect (Table 6, col-
umn 3), the expected annual benefit on an annual salary of Rs. 72,000 amounts to Rs. 
2160. Assuming a generous 20-year return period, this translates into an underwhelm-
ing internal rate of return of 1%. If individuals who had been placed but left their jobs 
due to discrimination had maintained their positions then the employment effect of 
the training course would have been 12.3%. Keeping all other parameters fixed, this 
translates into a healthy internal rate of return (IRR) of 23.3%. If we assume that the 
appropriate cost measure is the budgeted cost, then the IRR drops to − 3.1% for the 
3% employment effect and 13.2% for the employment effect if there had been no dis-
crimination. If we work with the estimated cost per trained graduate obtained from 
the macro-level data, then the corresponding returns for the low and high employment 
effects are − 12.1 and − 1.9, respectively. Based on this macro-level cost estimate, 
the employment effects needs to be at least 15% to break even and 30.6% in order to 
deliver an IRR of 8% which may be considered the opportunity cost of capital.
The DDUGKY scheme requires a 70% job placement rate at an annual minimum 
salary of Rs. 72,000 from the PIA. This is clearly an impossible target, setting aside 
the issue of whether such dictated job creation approaches are at all sensible. Nev-
ertheless, what these calculations show is that on the basis of the full-cost of pro-
ducing a trained graduate an employment impact estimate of about 15% yields a 
nonzero rate of return. This is not an impossible target and in the case of the train-
ing program under scrutiny the employment impact corrected for discrimination 
(12.3%) is not so far from the employment impact needed to deliver positive returns.
6  Concluding Remarks
Since 2014, the government of India has launched a number of skills training and 
job placement schemes. While substantial resources are being expended on this and 
similar schemes, there is very little evidence on their effectiveness in reaching their 
intended target and in generating employment opportunities.
This paper focused on evaluating the effects of one of the most prominent all-
India schemes, the ‘Deen Dayal Upadhayay Grameen Kaushal Yojana’ (DDUGKY), 
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which targets rural youth from poor families. That is, a group which is most likely 
to face a skills gap and for whom such skills training programs should be particu-
larly effective. We focused on the effects of the scheme in rural Bihar, one of India’s 
poorest states. The analysis was based on comparing individuals who had attended a 
training course sponsored through the scheme with individuals who had applied but 
did not eventually attend the training.
The empirical approach delivered comparable groups. Our assessment showed 
that the scheme is very well targeted, and more than 90% of those who attended the 
training and showed an interest in the scheme belonged to below-poverty-line fami-
lies. While the NGO appeared to have well-qualified personnel, the bulk of the par-
ticipants (64.6%) were not satisfied with the training they had received. With regard 
to employment effects, 42% of the graduates were placed immediately after the 
training, which translates into a 29% percentage point impact of training on employ-
ment. However, these gains were short-lived and within 2–6 months after training, 
the impact of the scheme on employment was statistically not different from zero. 
About a third of the placed graduates left their jobs due to caste discrimination and 
a third exited as the salaries offered were too low as compared to their expected liv-
ing costs. While employment effects were zero, the training did help graduates move 
from agricultural to non-agricultural positions.
The analysis presented here focused on one training course in one district of rural 
Bihar. While this paper does not paint a very optimistic picture of scheme-induced 
employment effects nor is it overtly negative about the scheme itself. Indeed, in the 
current case the positive effects of the scheme appear to have been partially undone 
by deep-rooted discrimination. It is entirely possible that other courses offered 
in other parts of the country are able to achieve higher placement rates and that 
trained graduates are not subject to post-placement discrimination.25 Notwithstand-
ing this possibility, what this paper highlights is the urgent need for credible analy-
ses of the slew of skills and job training programs that have recently been launched 
by the government. These analyses should focus not only on initial job placement 
Table 7  Pre-training and post-training—occupational distribution
Outcomes Pre-training Post-training
(at time of survey)
Nature of employment Part. Non-part. Part. Non-part.
Unengaged in economic activity 91.3 91.6 84.0 87.4
Self-employed in agriculture 0.40 0.40 – –
Self-employed in non-agriculture – 2.28 – 3.44
Informal regular wage, non-agri. 2.28 1.52 16.0 1.91
Formal regular wage, non-agri. 0.38 0.38 – 0.38
Daily wage worker 5.70 3.80 – 6.87
25 The placement rate of 42% achieved by the current course immediately after training is not very dif-
ferent from the macro-figures for DDUGKY which show an initial job placement rate of 49.6%.
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but also examine employment status after a time lag. Finally, while simply dictating 
job creation through such skills training courses and demanding 70% placement is 
unlikely to succeed, the analysis presented here shows that employment effects in 
the range of about 15% are likely to deliver a nonzero return.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
See Table 9.
Table 8  Internal rate of return—private perspective
a The minimum cost includes the tuition and boarding and lodging costs of one individual who attends 
the 3-month course offered by the project implementing agency
b The budgeted cost is the potential amount which may have to be paid out to the project implementing 
agency and includes items to be paid out in actuals and performance related payments
c The cost figure here is based on total DDUGKY costs and individuals trained since inception till end-
2016
d The expected benefit is based on annual earnings of Rs. 72,000 and a 3% increase in the probability of 
obtaining a job due to the training scheme
e The expected benefit is based on annual earnings of Rs. 72,000 and a 12.3% increase in the probability 
of obtaining a job, that is, the increase in employment probability if there had been no discrimination
f The expected benefit based on annual earning of Rs. 72,000 and a 15% increase in the probability of 
obtaining a job due to the training scheme. This is the employment effect which would lead to breakeven 
based on an estimated cost of Rs. 217,210 per trained graduate
g The expected benefit based on annual earning of Rs. 72,000 and a 32% increase in the probability of 
obtaining a job due to the training scheme. This is the employment effect which would lead to a return of 
8.5% on an estimated cost of Rs. 217,210 per trained graduate. The rate of return on a 1-year term deposit 
in selected Indian banks in 2017 is about 8%. This may be viewed as the opportunity cost of capital
h The duration of the payback period is set at 20 years and benefits are fixed for this duration
Cost/benefit
(Rs.)
Combination (Rs.) Returnsh
(%)
(i) Minimum cost of three-month residential  traininga 37,439 (i)–(iv) 1.0
(ii) Budgeted cost of three-month residential  trainingb 61,304 (i)–(v) 23.3
(iii) Cost of training based on total budget/trained 
 individualsc
217,210 (ii)–(iv) −3.1
(iv) Annual expected benefit—employment effect (3%)d 2160 (ii)–(v) 13.2
(v) Annual expected benefit—employment effect (12.3%)e 8856 (iii)–(iv) −12.1
(vi) Annual expected benefit—employment effect (15.0%)f 10,900 (iii)–(v) −1.9
(vii) Annual expected benefit—employment effect 
(30.6%)g
22,500 (iii)–(vi)
(iii)–(vii)
0.0
8.0
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